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I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, the substantive foundations of Anglo-American civil
1
law have been the doctrinal trio of contracts, torts, and property. Even
at present, separate courses on these three basic bodies of civil law are
2
the mainstay of the critical first year of American legal education.
Legal philosophers have debated and analyzed the nature of the three
3
for almost as long. This article describes a new way of evaluating the
trio and their interrelationships, based on Hegel’s famous dialectical
method. This article suggests an arithmetic analysis, namely that
property is the sum of tort and contract, and uses trade secrets, a type of
intellectual property, as the paradigm. The rights, remedies, and
available defendants in the three doctrines, as trade secret law
illustrates, provide evidence that the analysis is sound, and the article
concludes with practical consequences and examples the analysis
implies.
II. THESIS
In the modern American legal system, the concept or doctrine of
property is the arithmetic sum of the concepts or doctrines of contracts
and torts; trade secret law is an excellent illustration of this principle.
III. ROADMAP
This article commences with an introduction to the use of Hegel’s
famous dialectical method as an arithmetic analysis of law. It reviews
Hegel’s assertion that the sum of property and contract is tort and
crime, and then suggests a better dialectic that contract plus tort equals
property. This article then reviews the doctrines of contract, tort, and
property, focusing on the plaintiff’s rights and remedies, and who can be
defendants in each of the three doctrines. The article next reviews the
law of one particular type of intellectual property, trade secrets, because
this article uses trade secrets as a good example of how contract and tort
total to property. This article then culminates in an explanation of how
trade secrets illustrate that property is the sum of contract and tort,

1. See Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education: An
Historical Framework -- A History of U.S. Legal Education Phase I: From the Founding of the
Republic until the 1860s, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1041, 1057 (2006).
2.
See,
e.g.,
Office
of
Career
Services,
HARV.
L.
SCHOOL,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/degrees/jd/index.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
3. See, e.g., Richard Brooks, Law and Civil Society in the United States, Canada,
Quebec, and the First Nations, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 14 (1998).
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because property rights, remedies, and defendants are the total of
contract and tort rights, remedies, and defendants. This article gives
illustrations of how the thesis explains certain oddities from property
law other than intellectual property, and the article then concludes.
IV. ARITHMETIC LEGAL ANALYSIS
Recent decades have seen an explosion of various ways for
academics and practitioners to analyze the law. Famous examples
4
5
include economic analysis of law, feminist analysis of law,
6
7
psychological (and even psychoanalytic ) analysis of law, and so forth.
This article is written in the spirit of mathematical analysis of law,
suggesting that property is the arithmetic sum of contract and tort.
Mathematical analysis of law is not new; influential German idealist
philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was one of the first who
8
used it, with his famous dialectical method.
A. Hegel
1. Dialectics Are Sums
While regarded as one of the world’s greatest philosophers in all of
history, scholars today principally remember him for his dialectical
9
method. The “Idea,” Hegel’s name for reality, develops or “unfolds,”
10
according to him, through an unending dialectical process.
He
describes this process as beginning with a concept, any concept, which
11
he called the thesis. The concept immediately implies its opposite, or
12
negation, which he naturally called the antithesis. The thesis and its
13
The conflict
antithesis, being opposites, conflict with each other.
4. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994).
5. Marie-Claire Belleau, Mail-Order Brides in a Global World, 67 ALB. L. REV. 595
(2003).
6. Richard L. Wiener & Linda E. Hurt, Social Sexual Conduct at Work: How Do
Workers Know When It Is Harassment and When It Is Not?, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 53 (1997).
7. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 629 (2011).
8. WALTER KAUFMANN, HEGEL: A REINTERPRETATION § 37 (1966).
9. Id.
10. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, HEGEL’S SCIENCE OF LOGIC § 1640 (A.
V. Miller trans. 1969), available at http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/index.html
(last visited Feb. 29, 2012).
11. Id. at § 1631.
12. Id. at § 1632.
13. Id. at § 1633.
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resolves itself through a creative process of compromise between the
14
thesis and the antithesis. Hegel called the outcome the synthesis. The
synthesis is its own wholly new concept; i.e., the synthesis is a new
15
thesis. This new thesis immediately implies its own antithesis, these
two synthesize to create another new thesis, and the process continues
16
forever.
One of Hegel’s most famous dialectics, that of existence, serves well
as an example. Being is the thesis, but being implies its opposite, the
absence of being, which is nothingness. Bringing the thesis, being, and
its antithesis, nothing, together, results in the new concept of becoming
(which Hegel calls the “unity” of being and nothingness), the synthesis.
The synthesis, becoming, is the new thesis, which then implies its own
17
negation, and on the process goes.
Hegel’s concept of thesis and antithesis coming together and
resulting in something new, while unquestionably brilliant, is nothing
more than arithmetic addition (part of the elegant simplicity that makes
18
his concept so remarkable). In the mathematical process of addition,
19
two values come together (unify) and result in a new value.
2. Philosophy of Right
Hegel applied his dialectical theory to law (and much else) in his
book Elements of the Philosophy of Right. In that work, Hegel
described property as a function of individualism. A person, a human
individual, makes herself complete, according to Hegel, by (among
20
other things) possessing, enjoying, and using property. Property rights
are exclusive rights, in two senses: one, only a specific and relatively
small group of persons (usually just one) owns any particular private
property; and two, property rights are rights to exclude non-owners from
21
possession and use of the particular property.

14. Id. at § 1633.
15. Id. at § 1639.
16. Id. at § 1640.
17. Id. at §§ 132–34.
18. Id. at § 1633.
19. See generally, GEORGE M. BERGMAN, AN INVITATION TO GENERAL ALGEBRA
AND UNIVERSAL CONSTRUCTIONS (1998).
20. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT 97 (Allen W. Wood ed., Hugh Barr Nisbet trans., 1991).
21. Id. at 81.
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3. Thesis: Property (One Person’s Rights Alone)
One acquires property, according to Hegel, by involving the outside
object (which thus becomes the property) with oneself, or conversely, by
22
involving oneself with the object. He believed that property helps
23
define its owner, and helps the owner express himself as a person.
Hegel followed the lead of British philosopher John Locke, who earlier
suggested a narrower version of Hegel’s hypothesis, writing that a
person obtains property by mixing the person’s labor with the property
24
(e.g., farming land to produce edible crops, etc.). Hegel’s broader
theory would allow a person to become the owner of e.g., a tract of land,
25
merely by choosing it and fencing it off.
Hegel’s pure theory of property, as a dialectical thesis, involves only
26
the owning person and the owned object. The very essence of property
27
as a concept is that it excludes everyone, and indeed, everything else.
For any given property, all other objects that could be property, and all
other persons who could be owners, are by definition excluded from this
28
particular owner / property relationship. Here, Hegel followed the
celebrated “state of nature” concept of Locke and other champions of
the social contract, such as British philosopher Thomas Hobbes and
French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, all of whom suggested that
without law, a person can own property only by personally and
29
physically seizing and defending the property.
Hegel’s Philosophy of Right states, however, that any person is only
truly free and whole living in a civilized society with other people and
30
human institutions.
He therefore agrees with Hobbes, Locke, and
31
The pure owner
Rousseau that the social contract is necessary.
pursuant to Hegel’s property thesis will need to defend her claims
against all other persons’ claims by herself; for example, to prevent
trespassers, she might have to build an electrified fence or remain on the

22. Id. at 82.
23. Id. at 76.
24. Id. at 84.
25. Id. at 97.
26. Id. at 95.
27. Id. at 81.
28. Id.
29. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 29, 34 (1986),
available at http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtr05.htm.
30. HEGEL, supra note 20, at 95.
31. Id. at 105.
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32

property with a weapon at all times. Another problem she faces is
what to do with the bounty of the land (e.g., crops) beyond what she can
33
personally use herself.
4. Antithesis: Contract (Rights Distributed Among People)
Hegel’s property thesis, therefore (as always), necessarily implies its
own antithesis. To Hegel, the antithesis of property is contract. In
order for the property owner to make the most valuable and enriching
use of her property (e.g., selling its excess product, not having to guard
it personally at all times, etc.), the owner must accede to the social
34
contract and thus become part of human society. By being a part of
functioning society, the individual enhances her use and enjoyment of
35
her property. She can sell it or its products if she chooses, she can rely
on the government’s mechanisms and functionaries to enforce her rights
36
in it, she can lease it, etc. She does all these and all similar things
37
regarding her property by making agreements with other people. The
government will enforce her agreements, both for her and against her,
38
just as it enforces her property rights. This of course is contract, and
contract is thus (according to Hegel), the antithesis of property.
5. Synthesis: “Wrong” (i.e., Crime and Tort; Enforces Distributed
Rights)
Hegel’s synthesis of the property thesis and its contract antithesis is
39
what he called “wrong.” He uses the word as a noun in this sense,
meaning the whole of what modern American legal philosophers call
40
torts and crimes. Strict liability aside, torts and crimes require the
defendant to have some degree of mens rea, ranging from desiring harm
41
to another to simple carelessness. This is why Hegel refers to both as
32. Id. at 95.
33. Id. at 97.
34. Id. at 230.
35. Id. at 107.
36. Id. at 97, 270.
37. Id. at 109.
38. Id. at 253.
39. Id. at 117.
40. See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, A Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Intentional
Harm to Persons – Thoughts, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1335, 1336 (2009) (explaining intent
in tort); Dannye Holley, Mens Rea Evaluations by the United States Supreme Court: It Does
Not Have the Tools and Only Occasionally Displays the Talent—A Sixty-Year Report Card—
1950–2009, 35 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 401 (2010) (explaining mens rea in crime).
41. Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE
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“wrongs.” In Hegel’s view, the laws of tort and crime, and their
enforcement by the government and its courts, are the machinery of
defending and exonerating each individual’s rights (tort), and society’s
42
rights as a whole (crime). The property owner can thus use the police
to evict trespassers, get damages for trespass or breach, etc. (While
modern American law does not see breach of contract as a moral
43
44
wrong, for various policy reasons, the law in Hegel’s time did consider
45
breach a “wrong” in the sense of a tort. )
6. So Property + Contract = “Wrong”
One major dictionary describes “synthesis” as “the composition or
combination of parts or elements so as to form a whole[,] . . . the
46
combining of often diverse conceptions into a coherent whole.” The
same dictionary defines “addition” as “the operation of combining
47
numbers so as to obtain an equivalent simple quantity.” Note that the
definitions of synthesis and addition both contain the concept of
combining. Pursuant to Euclid’s geometric law of transitivity (things
48
equal to the same thing are equal to each other), the mathematical
equivalent of Hegel’s synthesis is therefore the arithmetic function of
addition; Hegel is asserting that in his political philosophy, property plus
contract equals tort and crime.
B. Criticism
Many philosophers and commentators over the centuries have
disagreed with, or criticized, Hegel’s methods, including his assertion
49
that wrong is the sum of property and contract. In modern American
law, at least, the arithmetic is different. While Hegel supplies a useful
precedent for arithmetic analysis of law, the better understanding, at
least here and now, is that property is not an addend but instead the
sum: the correct addends that equal property are contract and tort, as
DAME L. REV. 1551, 1561 (1999).
42. HEGEL, supra note 20, at 244–45.
43. 23 CAL. JUR. DAMAGES § 148 (3d ed. 2011).
44. Id.
45. HEGEL, supra note 20, at 250.
46. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/synthesis (last
visited Feb. 8, 2012).
47. MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/addition (last
visited Feb. 8, 2012).
BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/
48. ENCYCLOPEDIA
602836/transitive-law (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
49. See generally MICHAEL ROSEN, HEGEL’S DIALECTIC AND ITS CRITICISM (1985).
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the following sections explain.
C. Transition: Review of Contract, Tort, and Property
Now that this article has introduced the arithmetic analysis of law
concept and Hegel’s dialectic positing that contract plus property equals
tort and crime, this article next reviews the basics of the modern
American law of contract, tort, and property. This review focuses on
the various doctrines’ rights, remedies, and possible defendants as a
background to the introduction of how trade secret law illustrates that
the correct sum is contract plus tort equals property.
V. CONTRACT, TORT, AND PROPERTY: RIGHTS, DEFENDANTS, AND
REMEDIES
Writers have discoursed extensively for centuries on the definition
50
and nature of these three basic doctrines of civil law; it would be
redundant for this article to try to repeat or summarize these extensive
writings. This article instead presents one particular method of
comparing and contrasting the three doctrines that is useful for
demonstrating the validity of this article’s thesis.
That method of analysis is to ask, for each of the three doctrines,
against who does the plaintiff, in a suit based on the doctrine, have
enforceable rights? This article considers the answer to this question,
the underlying reasons for the answer, and the plaintiff’s related
remedies, in turn for each of contract, tort, and property. (As
injunctions are generally available in contract, tort, and property cases,
this article focuses on the damages remedy.)
A. Contract
1. Right Is to Performance
A contracting party has the legal right to the other party’s
51
performance of the contract.
2. Plaintiff Has Rights Against the Other Party to the Contract
A plaintiff’s action in contract seeks remedies against the other party
to the contract for the breach of that other person’s promise to the
50. George L. Priest, The Modern Transformation of Civil Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 957,
958 (2006).
51. See, e.g., 10 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 943 (Joseph M.
Perillo rev. ed., 1993) [hereinafter CORBIN 10].
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plaintiff to do, or refrain from doing, something that the plaintiff
52
wishes. To breach a promise is to fail to perform the promise fully at,
53
Almost all contracts are two party
or over, the proper time.
agreements, i.e., there are no more than two parties to the particular
54
contract. The parties generally form the contract by mutually agreeing;
55
In the typical bilateral contract, the
i.e., they exchange promises.
parties, at the time of contract formation, promise to perform in the
56
future.
a. Voluntary Defendant
In a contract action, therefore, the plaintiff and the defendant must
be the two parties to the contract the plaintiff claims the defendant
57
breached; no one else generally has standing. (There are limited, and
relatively recent, exceptions to this rule involving third party
58
beneficiaries.) To be a plaintiff in any particular breach of contract
action, therefore, a person must have entered into a specific contract in
the past with the particular person who is the defendant. (There are
again limited exceptions involving such things as assignment and
59
delegation; while these add some complexity to the analysis, the
60
underlying theory remains the same.)
There is, therefore, an extremely limited set of persons that any
particular plaintiff can sue for breach of any particular contract. In
almost all cases, there is only one person so amenable to the suit. That
one person is the other party, to this particular contract, of this
61
particular plaintiff. Contract plaintiffs have thus voluntarily entered in
a legal relationship with their defendants.
b. “Choice of Defendant”
Commentators, therefore, often state that the contract plaintiff has

52. 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.3 (Joseph M. Perillo
rev. ed., 1993) [hereinafter CORBIN 1].
53. CORBIN 10, supra note 51, at § 943.
54. CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at § 1.23.
55. CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at § 1.3.
56. CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at § 1.23.
57. CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at § 1.3.
58. 9 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 43.1 (Joseph M. Perillo
rev. ed., 1993) [hereinafter CORBIN 9].
59. Id. at § 47.1.
60. CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at § 1.3.
61. Id.at § 1.3.
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62

chosen her defendant in advance.
In breach of contract suits, the
63
defendant is almost never a stranger to the plaintiff. The requirement
of mutual assent for contract formation assures that plaintiff and
defendant knew each other, at least to some limited degree, and often
64
extensively, before entering into the agreement. The plaintiff chose
this defendant from whom to receive this particular performance. In
major transactions, the parties usually conduct what they call “due
diligence” before executing the agreement; this diligence often involves
65
lengthy and extensive investigation of the other party.
3. What Defendant Behavior Violates Rights
A defendant violates another’s contract rights by not performing an
unexcused promise in a legally enforceable agreement to which the
66
defendant and the other are parties.
4. Remedies Are Limited
This choice of defendants has significant practical consequences for
67
contract plaintiffs. One of the most important is the sharp limitations
that courts usually place on remedies for breach of contract, as opposed
68
to the usual remedies in tort and property actions.
a. Benefit of Bargain
The basic and preferred remedy for breach of contract is expectation
69
damages. This type of damages gives the non-breaching plaintiff the
70
so-called “benefit of the bargain.” A typical measure is the sales price
in cases regarding breaches of contracts for sales of property, whether
71
real or personal. If the buyer is the non-breaching plaintiff, the market
value of the subject property less the sales price is the expectation
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at § 1.12.
65. See generally Oldcastle Materials, Inc. v. Rohlin, 343 F. Supp. 2d 762 (N.D. Iowa
2004).
66. See, e.g., CORBIN 10, supra note 51, at § 943.
67. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 108 (1987)
(noting that the reasonable wealth and domicile of defendant can affect the laws applied to
the claim and, therefore, the available remedies).
68. E.g., 23 CAL. JUR. DAMAGES § 148 (3d ed. 2011).
69. 11 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 55.11 (Joseph M. Perillo
rev. ed., 1993) [hereinafter CORBIN 11].
70. Id.
71. Id.
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damages, allowing the plaintiff to purchase substitute property in the
72
open market.
b. No Penalties
Every American first year law student currently learns the important
73
difference between liquidated damages and penalties. Courts will of
course enforce reasonable liquidated damages, as long as these damages
74
Courts do not enforce penalties that
do not amount to penalties.
75
contracts may contain for breach.
The modern economic analysis of law movement has written
extensively about the sound public policy reasons behind not enforcing
76
penalties for contract breach. These reasons generally have to do with
the fact that all real world contracts are incomplete, and if the parties to
any particular contract had completed it, they would rationally have
realized, and incorporated into the contract, the undesirability of breach
77
penalties.
This leads to the concept of “economically efficient
breaches,” probably the best known theory of the law and economics
78
movement. Penalties for breach would discourage breaches that are
economically efficient, and this would reduce the wealth of society as a
79
whole.
c. No Punitive (or Emotional Distress or Pain and Suffering) Damages
Perhaps the most famous contract remedy limitation is punitive
damages. Courts generally refuse to award punitive damages for
breaches of contracts, regardless of the defendants’ bad faith, whereas
80
punitive awards are commonplace in many tort actions. Our legal

72. David W. Barnes, The Anatomy of Contract Damages and Efficient Breach Theory,
6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 397, 466 (1998).
73. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo, A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Eliminating the Law of
Liquidated Damages, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 633, 635 (2001).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 634.
76. See Gil Lahav, Contract Law: A Principle of Justified Promise-Breaking and Its
Application to Contract Law, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 163 (2000).
77. Richard R. W. Brooks, What Efficiency Demands: The Efficient Performance
Hypothesis Defended, 117 YALE L.J. Pocket Part 14, 15 (2007).
78. Lahav, supra note 76, at 163.
79. Brooks, supra note 77, at 19.
80. See, e.g., Patricia Maria Basseto Avallone, The Award of Punitive and Emotional
Distress Damages in Breach of Contract Cases: A Comparison between the American and the
Brazilian Legal Systems, 8 NEW ENG. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 253, 257 (2002).
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system indeed treats all contract breaches as intentional. There are a
82
variety of justifications for these doctrines (the basic reason is, as the
immediately preceding paragraph suggests, that our legal system does
83
not see contract breach as a moral wrong deserving punishment), but
as the text in section V(a)(ii)(2) above explains, one significant
justification is the ability of contract plaintiffs to choose their
84
defendants.
The underlying reasoning for this particular justification is that the
court should not punish a defendant, and correspondingly enrich the
plaintiff, when the parties had the opportunity to select each other from
various possible contractors, and used (as is inevitable) incomplete
85
contracts. Courts (and law and economics scholars) reason that in
typical contract cases plaintiffs and defendants had the opportunity to
investigate each other to ascertain, among other things, the other party’s
86
ability to perform, financial solvency, etc.
In this situation, the
contracting parties have voluntarily assumed a great deal of risk
87
regarding each other’s ability to perform and pay expectation damages.
(Courts similarly limit other types of damages, such as emotional
88
distress and pain and suffering, in contract cases for similar reasons.
Like punitives, these damages are generally available in tort and
89
property cases.)
d. Avoidability, Foreseeability, and Certainty
The law places important limitations on damages related to the
avoidability, foreseeability, and certainty of the damages requested.
Plaintiffs in general must prove that any claimed damages element was a
loss the plaintiff could not have reasonably avoided; that both parties
could reasonably have foreseen before the loss; and if the claimed
damages element is for something occurring after trial, that the loss is
81. See Richard Craswell, When Is a Willful Breach “Willful”? The Link between
Definitions and Damages, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1501, 1502 (2009).
82. Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 EMORY L.J. 439, 459 (2006).
83. Id.
84. See John A. Sebert, Jr., Punitive and Nonpecuniary Damages in Actions Based
upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation, 33 UCLA L. REV.
1565, 1566 (1986).
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 1567.
88. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–EQUITY– RESTITUTION
789 (2d ed. 1993).
89. See, e.g., id. at 572–75, 652–56.
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90

reasonably certain to occur.
These damage limitations apply to both tort and contract suits, but
91
courts enforce the limitations more strictly in contract cases. Contract
damages are indeed generally less generous to plaintiffs (and
92
correspondingly less burdensome to defendants) than tort damages.
Courts again use the choice of defendant rationale as one reason so to
93
limit contract damages. (Other reasons include the nature of many tort
injuries, such as bodily harm, compared to typical contract “injuries,”
94
which are generally economic in nature.)
As described above in section V(A)(2)(b), contract plaintiffs are
able to investigate their defendants, including the defendants’ financial
95
status and reputation, before the parties enter into their agreements.
Tort plaintiffs, on the other hand, are often at the mercy of chance
regarding who injures them. Contract plaintiffs typically pay their
lawyers by the hour, win or lose; tort plaintiffs usually pay their lawyers
96
on contingency. Tort judgments are therefore also generally more
generous to the plaintiff because plaintiffs pay their lawyers out of the
97
judgments’ proceeds.
In summary, contract damages are sharply
limited compared to tort damages.
B. Tort
1. Right is to Be Free of Injuries That Others Cause
Tort rights, at least pre-injury, are negative, in the sense that each
person has the right to be free of injuries others cause due to the others’
98
mens rea or strict liability.
2. Plaintiff Has Rights Against Injurers (Involuntary Defendants)
As the text above at section V(A)(2) suggests, tort plaintiffs are not
90. CORBIN 11, supra note 69, at § 56.2.
91. Banks McDowell, Foreseeability in Contract and Tort: The Problems of
Responsibility and Remoteness, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 286, 286–87 (1985).
92. See Sebert, supra note 84, at 1567.
93. Id. at 1566.
94. See, e.g., Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages: Why State
Farm Won’t Be the Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779, 794 (2004).
95. Sebert, supra note 84, at 1566.
96. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal
Malpractice, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 267, 274 (1998).
97. See, e.g., David G. Owen, Symposium, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions,
Problems, and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 366 (1994).
98. See, e.g., BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2011) (definition of “tort”).
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nearly as limited regarding the persons against whom the plaintiffs have
99
rights. At any given time, the universe of persons against whom any
individual has contract rights is extremely small; it is limited to those
persons with whom the individual has previously entered into still
100
enforceable contracts. The universe is larger for tort victims, because
they need not intend to enter into legally enforceable promises with
their defendants, tort plaintiffs merely need to interact in some way with
potential defendants.
Tort plaintiffs in general have rights against those who have injured
101
the plaintiff in some way.
That is, tort defendants, unlike contract
defendants, are not persons whom the plaintiff voluntarily pre-selected
for this particular legal relationship.
a. Zone of Danger
The universe of possible tort defendants for a given person at any
particular time is obviously much wider than that of possible contract
defendants. While the plaintiff can only sue a small group of persons
whom the plaintiff has pre-selected for contract breach, almost anyone
with whom the plaintiff interacts can injure the plaintiff in some legally
cognizable way. Many courts (and famously in some cases) refer to this
102
as the plaintiff’s danger zone.
b. Interaction Requirement
Tort law in general requires that the defendant injure the plaintiff’s
103
interests (e.g., body, property, dignity, etc.)
Injuring a person’s
interests usually requires some proximity to the plaintiff for the
interaction necessary for the injury to occur. The simplest and most
concrete example serves the best: to injure someone physically and
intentionally, the assailant (esoterica such as letter bombs aside), needs
104
Injuring a person’s property
to be spatially close to the victim.
similarly requires proximity, but it is possible to injure a person’s
intangible interests (e.g., reputation) without such proximity.
99. See, e.g., J. E. Leonarz, Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Claimant’s Efforts
to Recover from Other Sources As Prerequisite of Participation in Indemnity Fund for Losses
Caused by Uninsured or Unknown Motorists, 7 A.L.R. 851 (3d ed. 1966).
100. See, e.g., CORBIN 9, supra note 58, at § 41.1.
101. Leonarz, supra note 99.
102. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 350 (1928) (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
103. Id. at 345.
104. Id. at 350.
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c. Some Plaintiff Choice
In many cases, tort plaintiffs have exercised some degree of choice
regarding the defendants who injured the plaintiffs. If a particular
plaintiff fears injury by a particular party, or class of persons, the
plaintiff can avoid interacting with those persons.
d. Employers, Other Drivers, Owners of Land, Etc.
There are, for example, certain situations and locations in which
torts occur most frequently. Automobile accidents are of course a
105
common source of torts at present. If a person wants to avoid such an
injury, he can refrain from driving, drive only in less trafficked locations,
or drive during off hours; he can avoid stretches of road at time when he
knows them to contain careless or reckless drivers, etc. Workplace
106
injuries are another common tort.
(This article ignores workers’
compensation systems for simplicity of analysis; this does not affect the
article’s thesis.) When a person agrees to take a certain job, she to some
degree chooses to run the risk of injury by her coworkers. Landowners
and the people who enter the land are choosing to expose themselves to
the risk of injury by the other.
In many tort cases, however, it is by random chance that a given
defendant harms a given plaintiff. One person can defame another
without ever having met the other person or come into any contact with
107
the other’s property. Property law (especially intangible property) is
like tort law in this respect because a property defendant can be a
complete stranger, with whom the plaintiff has never interacted. For
example, the United States Patent and Trademark office publishes all
relevant information about every patented invention online; anyone in
the world with internet access can easily acquire all the information
108
necessary to infringe.
3. What Defendant Behavior Violates Rights
A defendant violates another’s right to be free of torts by injuring
109
the other person, with some degree of mens rea or by strict liability.

105. See generally RICHARD S. KUHLMAN, KILLER ROADS: FROM CRASH TO
VERDICT (1986).
106. See generally ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’
COMPENSATION LAW (2011).
107. See, e.g., BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98 (defintion of “tort”).
108. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
109. See, e.g., BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98 (defintion of “tort”).
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4. Remedies Are Expansive
Tort remedies reflect the increased set of possible defendants, and
the lesser choice made by plaintiffs in exposing themselves to particular
defendants, as opposed to contract cases.
a. More Generous Than Contract
For reasons the text above at section V(b)(ii) mentions, tort
remedies are more generous to plaintiffs, ceteris paribus, than contract
remedies.
b. To Make Plaintiff Whole
The principal goal of contract remedies is to give the plaintiff the
benefit of her bargain; i.e., damages representing what she reasonably
110
expected to receive from the breaching defendant.
In commercial
transactions of all types, both business and personal, contracting parties
can reasonably expect to receive only reasonable amounts, and amounts
111
roughly in some proportion with the consideration exchanged.
In torts, however, the remedial goal is to make the plaintiff whole;
i.e., the damages should put her in her pre-tort position as best as money
112
can.
Unlike contract breaches, which cause mostly commercial
113
harm, torts are much more likely to be personal, bodily, and
114
devastating, and indeed even fatal. Plaintiffs injured when young can
115
recover a lifetime of lost wages and medical expenses, plus possibly
amounts to compensate them for psychological damage like pain and
116
suffering. As the text above at sections V(a)(ii) and V(b)(ii) implies,
plaintiffs can also recover punitive damages for certain torts. Pain and
suffering, mental distress, and the amount necessary to punish a
defendant for any particular tort, are often difficult to measure, which
117
may result in sympathetic fact finders choosing very large amounts.

110. Sebert, supra note 84, at 1569.
111. Id.
112. See, e.g., Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Measure of Damages for Wrongful
Death of Child under Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b), 2671–80), 25 A.L.R.
Fed. 179 (2008).
113. Sebert, supra note 84, at 1568.
114. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 112.
115. See, e.g., id.
116. Id.
117. See generally BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
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c. Avoidability, Foreseeability, and Certainty Doctrines More Limited
Courts also restrict the principal doctrines limiting recovery, i.e.,
avoidability, foreseeability, and certainty, in tort cases. In tort cases,
courts generally deem foreseeable any injury the plaintiff’s wrongful
118
action or omission caused, even if by indirect means.
In contract
cases, by contrast, courts only allow damages for events both parties
reasonably should have anticipated, at the time the parties entered into
119
the relevant contract, in event of the eventual breach.
Avoidability in tort cases usually just prohibits the plaintiff from
120
actions or omissions that would make their injuries worse. In contract
cases, plaintiffs generally have an affirmative duty to mitigate their
121
damages, as by, e.g., seeking alternative buyers or sellers. Certainty in
tort cases is generally equivalent to foreseeability, which in turn is much
122
like causation; in contracts, however, the plaintiff bears the burden of
123
proving the reasonable certainty of any damages element she claims.
Courts justify relaxing these limitations for the same reasons the text
above in section V(a)(ii) describes, at least in part because of the tort
plaintiff’s more limited ability to choose his defendant, and the
correspondingly larger universe of possible tort defendants.
In summary, tort damages are much more extensive than contract
damages.
C. Property
1. Rights Are to Exclusive Possession, Use, and Enjoyment
The owner’s rights in a piece of property are to exclusive possession,
124
use, and enjoyment of the property.
2. Plaintiff Has Rights “Against All the World” (Anyone Can Be
Defendant)
The universe of potential defendants is larger in property cases than
it is in tort cases (in which, in turn, it is larger than in contract cases). As
118. See, e.g., Milos v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 478 F. Supp 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
119. See, e.g., Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Exchequer).
120. See, e.g., Hall v. Dumitru, 250 Ill. App. 3d 759, 765 (1993).
121. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2–715(2)(a) (2011).
122. See, e.g., Jorgenson v. Vener, 616 N.W.2d 366, 369.
123. See, e.g., Drews Co. v. Ledwith-Wolfe Assocs., Inc., 371 S.E.2d 532, 534 (S.C.
1988).
124. E.g., Ralston Steel Car Co. v. Ralston, 147 N.E. 513 (Ohio 1925); Wilcox v. Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 21 (Pa. 1947).
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the text above in section V(A)(2) explains, in contract cases, the set of
possible defendants is those with whom plaintiff has contracted
(voluntary defendants); in tort cases, it is those to whom plaintiff has
exposed herself regarding injury risk (involuntary defendants).
In property cases, however, the famous expression is that property
125
owners have rights against “all the world,”
i.e., everyone,
126
There is no limit to the set of potential defendants.
everywhere.
When the property in question is tangible, including realty and chattels,
the issue may arise of possible defendants having some spatial proximity
to the property, but when the property is intangible (such as intellectual
property, for example), there is no longer any spatial limitation on
possible defendants.
3. Even Total Strangers Can Infringe or Trespass
In contract and tort cases, there has to be some relationship between
the plaintiff and defendant, even some degree of the plaintiff seeking
out the defendant; but in property cases even total strangers to the
127
plaintiff can trespass or infringe.
The archetypical property, real
estate, gives the best examples. Real estate, land and the buildings that
128
improve it, is by definition immovable.
Owners of real estate are
often absent from the parcel for very long periods, and quite far away
129
There is, indeed, absolutely no necessity for
from it geographically.
130
the owner of a parcel ever to visit it.
An owner’s dominion does not extend beyond the borders of her
131
real property.
It is beyond her control to prevent anyone (in most
132
She therefore can
cases) from coming to the edge of her property.
have no idea who, if anyone, can trespass on her parcel. She does not
need to invite or license the stranger’s presence near her real estate. If
she is far away, she can be completely unaware of the trespass itself and
the trespasser’s identity.
The same is true of chattels, which are often far away from their

125. See Locke, supra note 29, at § 39.
126. E.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 189–90 (1984).
127. For an example from 1365, see David S. Bogen, The Innkeeper’s Tale: The Legal
Development of a Public Calling, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 51, 67 (1996).
128. See, e.g., 63 C. AM. JUR. PROP. § 13 (2d ed. 2011).
129. Id. at § 29.
130. Id.
131. 49 P.L.E. Trespass § 39 (2011).
132. Id.
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133

owners, and even more true for most intangible property, which has
134
Intellectual property, patents and copyrights in
no specific location.
particular, are notoriously difficult for owners to police in today’s
networked world. After a patentee sells an embodiment of his
invention, for example, he cannot control the embodiment’s subsequent
possessors, each of whom may be able to reverse engineer the invention
135
and infringe without the patentee’s knowledge. In this digital age, the
challenge of copyright owners in preventing unauthorized copying is
136
Complete strangers to the plaintiff property owner can
notorious.
trespass or infringe and become property claim defendants.
One can therefore, in sum, think of possible contract defendants as
voluntarily chosen by the plaintiff, possible tort defendants as
involuntary, and property defendants as the sum of voluntary and
involuntary defendants: everyone, or “all the world.”
4. What Defendant Behavior Violates Rights
A defendant violates another’s property rights by unreasonably
interfering with the other’s possession, use, or enjoyment of the other’s
137
property.
5. Remedies Regardless of Plaintiff’s Loss
Contract remedies give the plaintiff what she expected from the
defendant; tort remedies make the plaintiff whole after the defendant’s
injury. An owner with infringed property rights can receive remedies
138
regardless of any loss to the owner. Property based causes of action
are also generally strict liability; as in some torts, the plaintiff need
139
prove no type of mens rea on the defendant’s part in order to prevail.
(As section V(a)(iv)(3) above explains, courts generally deem all
contract breaches to be intentional, regardless of the defendant’s actual
140
subjective state of mind in any case.)
133.
134.
135.

See, e.g., 63 C. AM. JUR. PROP. § 30 (2d ed. 2011).
See, e.g., 16 AM. JUR. CONFLICT OF LAWS § 46 (2d ed. 2011).
See, e.g., Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World,
19 DAYTON L. REV. 843, 845 (1994).
136. Gerardo Lara, Comment, The Piracy of American Films in China: Why the U.S.
Art Form Is Not Protected by Copyright Laws in the People’s Republic of China, 2 UCLA J.
INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 343 (1997).
137. E.g., Ralston Steel Car Co. v. Ralston, 147 N.E. 513 (Ohio 1925); Wilcox v. Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 21 (Pa. 1947).
138. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc., 320 B.R. 772, 776 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
139. See, e.g., AM. JUR. TRESPASS § 7 (2d ed. 2011).
140. Craswell, supra note 81, at 1502.
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a. To Exonerate Property Right
The law’s lack of any actual injury or mens rea requirement for
actions enforcing property rights follows from the very nature of those
rights. Property rights after all are by definition exclusive. As the text
above at section IV(a)(ii) explains, there are a defined finite number of
legal persons who are any property’s owners, and the owners’ property
right is the legal right to exclude everyone else from the property.
Property owners may do almost anything with their property: use it,
141
ignore it, share it, assign it, destroy it, etc. To preserve these owners’
rights, the law must prevent, or at least respond to, any interference
with a property owner’s rights, even one without injury or any degree of
mens rea.
b. Nominal Damages Available
One way the law responds to interferences with a property owner’s
rights that are unintentional, harmless, or both, is by awarding nominal
142
damages. Trespassers to land, for example, are liable to landowners
for nominal damages, even if the defendants trespassed unintentionally,
143
and even if the trespasses caused no harm to the land or landowners.
If property rights are to be exclusive, the underlying policy requires that
there be some vindication of the rights of owners who did not consent to
144
the defendants’ mere presence on their properties. Nominal damages
145
are often available in both tort and contract based causes of action.
6. Summary and Transition
All the remedies available under both contract and tort law are thus
available under property law. Any remedy that it available under either
contract or tort law is also available under property law.
This article has reviewed and analyzed the basics of contract, tort,
and property law, paying special attention to the rights, remedies, and
possible defendants pursuant to each doctrine. This article will next
explain trade secrets, so as to use them as a paradigm regarding how
contract and tort rights, remedies, and defendants sum to property
rights, remedies, and defendants.

141. See, e.g., AM. JUR. PROP. § 31 (2d ed. 2011).
142. In re WorldCom, Inc., 320 B.R. at 780.
143. Id. at 780–81 n. 9.
144. See, e.g., Stuart Cay Marina v. M/V Special Delivery, 510 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1074–
75 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
145. DOBBS, supra note 88, at 221.
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VI. TRADE SECRETS
Trade secrets are a common and well-known type of intellectual
146
property.
They provide, intriguingly, an excellent example of how
property rights, defendants, and remedies are the arithmetic sum of
contract and tort rights and remedies.
A. Definition
A trade secret is simply “. . . business information that is kept
147
confidential to maintain an advantage over competitors . . . .”
A
thorough parsing of the definition aids in a detailed understanding of
trade secrets.
1. Information
A trade secret is information. There are two similar, but slightly
different, detailed definitions of trade secrets in our modern law: one is
from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and the other is from the
148
Restatement of Torts. Both give an explicitly nonexclusive list of the
type of information that can qualify as a trade secret, including such
information as formulas, processes, devices, patterns, compilations,
149
programs, methods, techniques, and processes.
2. Independent Economic Value to Possessor
In order for information to qualify as a trade secret, the information
must “derive independent economic (i.e., “trade”) value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known or readily ascertainable by
150
others who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use.”
146. Karl F. Jorda, The Foulston Siefkin Lecture, Patent and Trade Secret
Complementariness: An Unsuspected Synergy, 48 WASHBURN L. J. 1 (2008).
147. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1633 (9th ed. 2009).
148. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 (1985) (“‘Trade secret’ means information,
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process.”);
Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J. LAW &
TECH. 427, 431 (setting forth the definition of “trade secret” from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757).
149. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 (1985) (“‘Trade secret’ means information,
including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process”);
Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J. LAW &
TECH. 427, 431 (setting forth the definition of “trade secret” from RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757); see also, e.g., Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. N. Am. Mortg. Co., 381 F.3d 811, 818–19
(8th Cir. 2004).
150. See, e.g., Gary S. Gaffney & Maria E. Ellison, A Primer on Florida Trade Secret
Law: Unlocking the “Secrets” to “Trade Secret” Litigation, 11 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 12
(2003) (quoting Florida statute based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
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Independent economic value in this context means that the
information’s possessor must have economic value (as opposed to, e.g.,
psychological gratification, etc.) from possessing the information, and
the that value must be due to the inability of others (especially the
possessor’s competitors) to use the information (not from, e.g., the
151
For
inherent value of information that is useful but not secret).
example, a manufacturer may possess information that allows the
manufacturer to make its product more cheaply than competitors.
3. Because Not Generally Known
The name trade secret indicates that the heart of this intellectual
property is its secrecy, and thus the very definition requires that the
information, to keep its property nature, must remain unavailable to
152
non-owners.
B. Property
Trade secret is the rare exception in our legal system in which pure
153
information, by itself, has the characteristics of property. A major law
dictionary defines “property” as:
that dominion or indefinite right of use[ ], control, and
disposition [that] one may lawfully exercise over particular things
154
or objects . . . . The right and interest [that] a [person] has in
155
lands and chattels to the exclusion of others . . . . The right of a
156
person to possess, use, enjoy, and dispose of a thing.
Note that this definition, while current, does not comfortably
encompass intellectual property (which, while certainly not land, is not
exactly a chattel either), or indeed any intangible property.
1. Law Recognizes Trade Secrets as Property
Our law does, however, recognize and enforce property rights (i.e.,
exclusion rights) in various forms of intellectual property; the name is
151.
(2010).
152.
153.
154.
(2011)).
155.
156.

Eric E. Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 545, 546
Id.
See, e.g., id.
BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98 (citing AM. JUR. PROPERTY § 2
Id. (citing Ralston Steel Car Co. v. Ralston, 147 N.E. 513 (Ohio 1925)).
Id. (citing Wilcox v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 A.2d 21 (Pa. 1947)).
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157

2. Intellectual
Each form of intellectual property comes with a set of exclusive
rights; i.e., the right of the property owner to prevent others from using
158
or enjoying the intangible property.
Patent owners, for example,
enjoy the right to prevent others from making, using, selling, or
159
importing the patented invention; copyright owners have the right to
prevent others from reproducing, adapting, or publicly distributing,
160
displaying, or performing the copyrighted work; etc.
C. How Owner Keeps Trade Secrets as Property: Reasonable Secrecy
The owner of a trade secret enjoys the right to prevent others from
161
using or disclosing the subject information. To keep property rights in
information as a trade secret, the information possessor must take
162
affirmative continuing steps to keep the information to itself.
To win a trade secret infringement suit, the information’s possessor
must affirmatively demonstrate that the possessor took reasonable steps
to keep the information secret, even if those steps would not have
163
prevented the particular infringement alleged. There are two general
methods of keeping information secret to which courts look to satisfy
this requirement.
1. Physical Protection of Information
One way for the information possessor who desires trade secret
property rights to keep the information secret is by physically protecting
164
the information from discovery by others.
This can be as simple as
locking documents containing the information in a drawer, or password
165
protecting the information on computer systems.
If physical plant
157. Shubha Ghosh, Exclusivity -- the Roadblock to Democracy?, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
799, 803 (2006).
158. Id.
159. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
160. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
161. Ghosh, supra note 157, at 803.
162. E.g., Enter. Leasing Co. v. Ehmke, 3 F.3d 1065, 1071 (7th Cir. 1999).
163. E.g., id.
164. E.g., Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So. 2d 130, 132–33 (Ala. Civ. App.
1987) (the infamous “Lynchburg Lemonade” case).
165. Brian Bolinger, Focusing on Infringement: Why Limitations on Decryption
Technology Are Not the Solution to Policing Copyright, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1103
(2002).
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embodies the information, for example, hiring security guards to keep
166
unauthorized people from observing the plant qualifies.
2. Nondisclosure Agreements
The other way for the possessor to keep the information qualified
for trade secret property right protection is by refusing to share the
167
If, e.g., the possessor is a corporation, the
information with others.
possessor must not reveal the information to anyone outside the
corporate organization. If the possessor is an individual, the possessor
must not reveal the information to anyone else.
This limitation is impractical, of course, if the possessor, as is very
often the case, needs others to know the information in order for the
168
possessor to exploit the information fully.
The law is therefore
flexible on this point, allowing information possessors to share the
information with others, without losing the information’s property
exclusion characteristic, as long as the possessor first requires the
recipient to agree (by contract, express or implied) to keep the
169
information confidential.
Even without any enforceable contract, a
person who receives information pursuant to a confidential (i.e.,
fiduciary) relationship, may not legally misuse or disclose the
170
information without the beneficiary’s consent.
As trade secret information is by definition commercial, most
businesses, as a matter of course, require their employees and
contractors who need to know the information to execute
confidentiality agreements before the businesses disclose the
171
information.
As long as a possessor requires reasonable and legally
enforceable nondisclosure agreements before disclosing the
172
information, courts will enforce a property right in the trade secret.
D. How Defendant Infringes Owner’s Legal Rights
Before relating how defendants infringe trade secret owners’ rights,
166. Derek P. Martin, An Employer’s Guide to Protecting Trade Secrets from
Employee Misappropriation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 949, 955–56 (1993).
167. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and
the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 167, 186 (2005).
168. See, e.g., Friemuth v. Fiskars Brands, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 985, 989 (W.D. Wis.
2010).
169. See, e.g., id.
170. See, e.g., id.
171. See, e.g., id.
172. See, e.g., id.
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this article briefly recounts, for context, how defendants infringe other
plaintiffs’ rights.
1. Contract and Tort
As the text above in sections V(A)(3), V(B)(3), and V(C)(4)
describes, a defendant infringes a contract right by failing to perform a
173
legally enforceable promise. A defendant infringes a tort right (more
174
precisely the plaintiff’s right to be free of torts) by an unexcused
action or omission that has the requisite degree of mens rea or strict
175
liability, and that causes a cognizable injury to the plaintiff.
A
defendant infringes a property right by unreasonably interfering with
the plaintiff owner’s use, possession, or enjoyment of the relevant
176
property.
2. Property Other Than Intellectual
a. Tangible
Courts enforce most non-contractual causes of action arising from
177
the plaintiff’s tangible chattels as torts. Minor interferences constitute
178
trespass to chattels; major interferences, such as dispossession and
179
Some major non-contractual
destruction, constitute conversion.
causes of action arising from plaintiff’s realty are also torts, principally
180
181
trespass to land.
Causes of action for nuisance are quasi-tort.
Property based torts are generally strict liability, while most other torts
182
require some degree of mens rea.
The purest property causes of action (neither contract nor tort based
in our legal system) regarding realty are in gross rights and
183
corresponding burdens such as prescriptive easements,
and
173. CORBIN 1, supra note 52, at § 1.3.
174. See, e.g., Sonnier v. United States Casualty Co., 157 So. 2d 911, 913 (La. App.
1963).
175. See, e.g., BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98 (defintion of “tort”).
176. See, e.g., AM. JUR. PROPERTY § 1 (2d ed. 2011).
177. See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
178. Spickler v. Lombardo, 3 Pa. D. & C.3d 591, 599–600 (1977).
179. DirecTV, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d. at 1062.
180. Winters v. Turner, 278 P. 816, 818 (Utah 1929).
181. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and
Economics, and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1381 (2010).
182. See, e.g., AM. JUR. TRESPASS § 7 (2d ed. 2011).
183. See, e.g., Plymouth Canton Comm. Crier, Inc. v. Prose, 619 N.W.2d 725, 726
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000).
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appurtenant rights and corresponding burdens such as involuntary
184
These are nevertheless theoretically based in either
servitudes.
contract or tort (e.g., prescriptive easements can arise when property
owners ignore trespassers, thereby presumably either waiving the
185
owners’ tort rights or impliedly agreeing to the use).
b. Intangible
Courts have traditionally had more difficulty in general dealing with
186
intangible property, because of its ethereal nature. This challenge has
run through all aspects of property law: it took centuries for courts even
187
to accept tangible chattels as property like land, and even longer for
188
courts to grant the same dignity to intangibles.
Intangible property currently represents more of American wealth
189
than ever before, and property law now protects intangibles just as it
does tangible property. Dispossessing a rightful owner of her noncurrency money (e.g., bank accounts, intangible property that represents
190
191
about 90% of the money supply) amounts to the tort of conversion,
as does similar dispossession of assets like marketable securities (most
192
of which are now non-certificated).
3. Intellectual Property
a. Other Than Trade Secrets
All intellectual property is intangible; it is, indeed, intangible to the
second order, because not only are the legal rights intangible (as are all
193
legal rights), but the subject matter of the rights are intangible as well.
While machines, manufactured articles, and compositions of matter may
184. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 30 So. 2d 746, 753 (La. 1946).
185. See AM. JUR. EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN REAL PROPERTY § 39 (2d ed. 2011).
186. Kazi v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 15 P.3d 223, 229 (Cal. 2001).
187. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 7 n. 4 (Little Brown
1981).
188. See, e.g., KENNETH L. PORT, JAY DRATLER, JR., FAYE M. HAMMERSLEY,
TERENCE P. MCELWEE, CHARLES R. MCMANIS, AND BARBARA A. WRIGLEY, LICENSING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 6 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter PORT].
189. See, e.g., id. at xvii.
190. See, e.g., The Money Supply, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK,
http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed49.html (one of many money supply
publications by the Federal Reserve System of the United States).
191. E.g., Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Power Prods., 27 V.I. 126, 129 (Terr.Ct
1992).
192. See, e.g., Opdyke v. Sec. S&L Co., 97 N.E.2d 435 (Ohio Ct. Common Pleas 1950).
193. See, e.g., PORT, supra note 188, at 6.
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194

embody patented inventions,
changes in ownership of these
195
embodiments do not change the ownership of the underlying patent.
Copies and so-called “phonorecords” (which now includes compact
196
disks, video disks, computer drives containing digital copies, etc.)
197
embody copyrighted works of authorship, but again, these tangible
embodiments (chattels) are property separate from the underlying
198
copyright.
To infringe a patent, a person must make, use, sell, or import
199
embodiments of the patented invention without authorization.
To
infringe a copyright, a person must reproduce, adapt, or publicly
distribute, display, or perform the copyrighted work without
200
authorization.
Infringement actions are strict liability; that is, the
201
defendant need not intend to infringe in order to be liable.
Infringements of intellectual property rights are pure property causes of
202
action. Infringements are also not breaches of contract; no one need
203
first agree not to infringe to be liable.
b. Trade Secrets
Trade secrets are intellectual property, as are patents and
204
copyrights, but trade secrets’ method of infringement is unique in a
way that dramatically demonstrates that property is the sum of tort and
contract. To infringe on the trade secret property right, a person must
do one of two things: breach a contract or commit a tort. (While the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act calls the action creating liability relating to
205
trade secrets “misappropriation,” “infringement” is a better word.
This is not only because “infringement” is consistent with liability

194. See Day v. Union India-Rubber Co., 7 F. Cas. 271, 272 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1856).
195. Id. at 274.
196. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
197. See id.
198. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
199. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
200. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006); see, e.g., TMTV Corp. v. Pegasus Broad. of San Juan, 490
F. Supp. 2d 228, 235 (D.P.R. 2007).
201. Gener-Villar v. Adcom Group, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 117, 124 (D.P.R. 2007).
202. See, e.g., SAPC, Inc. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 1009, 1013 (D. Mass. 1988).
203. James M. McCarthy, When Does a Case Involving the Breach of a Copyright
Licensing Contract “Arise under” the Copyright Act?, 19 DAYTON L. REV. 165, 169 (1993)
(discussing copyright infringement as a property claim and not a breach of contract claim).
204. Johnson, supra note 151, at 546.
205. See, e.g., Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Uniform Trade Secrets Act -- Trends and
Prospects, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 409, 425 (2010).
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206

regarding other forms of intellectual property, but also because some
actions causing trade secret liability do not in fact amount to
misappropriation, but rather misuse, such as acquiring trade secret
information by mistake and using or disclosing it after notice of the
207
mistake.)
i. By Breaching Nondisclosure Agreement
One of the two ways to infringe a trade secret is to use or disclose
the relevant information in contravention of a legally enforceable
208
confidentiality agreement.
If a recipient of information, in order to
receive information that qualifies as a trade secret, first promises
(whether expressly or impliedly) not to use or disclose that information
in a particular way, and then does so, the recipient is liable for trade
secret infringement (i.e., has violated a property right), because the
209
recipient has breached a contract.
ii. Or by Tort
The only other way to infringe a trade secret is by acquiring,
disclosing, or using the information against the will of the information’s
210
lawfully rightful possessor (i.e., the trade secret property owner).
Note that, as the text immediately below describes in detail, one can
only do this by committing a tort.
(a) By the Tort of Conversion
For example, if a paper document that is not the property of the
infringer contains the trade secret information, the infringer converts a
chattel by taking the document. If an intangible document (e.g., a
computer file) that is not the infringer’s property contains the
information, it is still conversion if the infringer takes the intangible
document, or the information it contains, without the owner’s
211
permission.
(b) By the Tort of Trespass
Many cases show that a typical way for a trade secret infringer to
206.
E.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 851 (9th ed. 2009) (definition of
“infringement”).
207. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(2)(ii) (1985).
208. See, e.g., id. at § 1(2)(ii)(B)(II).
209. See, e.g., City Slickers, Inc. v. Douglas, 40 S.W.3d 805, 811–12 (Ark. Ct. App.
2001).
210. See, e.g., id. at 808 (The trade secret holder’s active concealment of the secret
implies that obtaining and using information is against the will of the trade secret holder.).
211. See, e.g., DirecTV, Inc. v. Ostrowski, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
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acquire the subject information, without authorization, is to enter the
trade secret owner’s property so that the infringer can, by observation,
212
obtain the information. Such behavior is of course the tort of trespass
to land, even if the owner is merely leasing the land or building into
213
which the infringer entered.
Courts presume that the owner would
never authorize an entry that is wrongfully to acquire information the
214
owner treats as a trade secret.
(c) By the Tort of Invasion of Privacy
There are cases in which trade secret infringement defendants
acquire the relevant information not pursuant to a contract and without
entering the plaintiff’s premises either without permission or under false
215
pretenses.
In these cases, the defendants often observe the relevant
information from a distance, using some type of surveillance equipment
216
(possibly as simple as cameras, or as complex as hiring photographers
217
These cases still involve some sort of
to fly over defendant’s site).
tortious or at least quasi-tortious behavior by the defendant or her
218
agents, namely invasion of privacy. Trade secret law requires that the
defendant, to be liable for infringement in these cases, have some
219
degree of tort mens rea, such as “commercial improprieties.”
(d) By the Tort of Fiduciary Duty Breach
In some cases recipients of information may have not have agreed to
keep the information secret and may have received the information in a
manner that did not involve any wrongful conduct by the recipient. The
recipient may nevertheless have received the information pursuant to a
relationship in which the recipient was acting as a fiduciary. Many
relationships, most notably agency (which includes employment and
most professional relationships), make one of the parties the fiduciary
220
of the other. The fiduciary relationship places strict legal obligations
on the fiduciary in favor of the other party to the relationship (the
212. See, e.g., Coleman v. Vukovich, 825 N.E.2d 397, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
213. See, e.g., id.
214. See, e.g., AM. JUR. TRESPASS § 74 (2d ed. 2011).
215. See, e.g., Coleman, 825 N.E.2d at 407.
216. Samuel J. Horovitz, If You Ain’t Cheating You Ain’t Trying: “Spygate” and the
Legal Implications of Trying Too Hard, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 305, 307 (2009)
(discussing professional football coaching staff’s use of cameras to learn play signals from
opposing teams).
217. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir.
1970).
218. Id. at 1016.
219. Id. at 1015.
220. Cemen Tech, Inc. v. Three D Indus., L.L.C., 753 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Iowa 2008).
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222

beneficiary), including a duty of confidence. (Indeed, writers often
223
call fiduciary relationships “confidential” relationships.)
A person who receives information pursuant to a fiduciary
relationship therefore has a legal obligation to keep the information
confidential, and not to use the information for the recipient’s own
purposes, unless waived by the beneficiary.
Breach of this
224
confidentiality obligation is a tort.
(e) By a Strict Liability Tort
Trade secret infringement can be strict liability, just as in patent,
225
copyright, and other property and tort law. That is, a defendant need
not have any degree of mens rea to be liable for intellectual property
infringement, although intentional infringement may lead to enhanced
226
damages.
There are several ways a recipient of trade secret information can
227
violate the owner’s rights without intending to infringe. For example,
if an information recipient learns the information due to a third party’s
breach of a confidentiality requirement, but the recipient does not know
that the information is a trade secret and that the third party breached,
228
the recipient can use or disclose the information without liability.
Once the recipient constructively learns of the breach and the trade
229
secret status of the information, continued use is infringement.
4. Transition and Synthesis
When one thoughtfully considers all the facts above together, one
can see how trade secret law illustrates that property law is the
arithmetic sum of contract law and tort law.

221. E.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed. 2009) (definition of “fiduciary”).
222. Cemen Tech, Inc., 753 N.W.2d at 8.
223. Id. at 13.
224. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979).
225. See, e.g., Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n. 2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997)); Lipton v. Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 471 (2d
Cir. 1995).
226. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 284; Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 3(b)
(1985).
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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VII. TRADE SECRETS ARE SUM OF RELATED CONTRACT AND TORT
RIGHTS, DEFENDANTS, AND REMEDIES
A. Trade Secrets Are Property, But . . .
In review, our law treats qualifying trade secret information as the
property of the rightful possessor. Trade secrets are one of the four
basic types of intellectual property (the others being copyright, patent,
230
and trademark). The owner of a trade secret can get courts to enforce
his property rights in the information, by awarding him damages from
231
the infringing defendant, by enjoining the defendant, or both. To do
this, however, the owner must prove at least one of two things.
1. Infringement Requires Breach of Contract
The owner must prove that the defendant failed to perform a legally
enforceable promise of the defendant’s to the plaintiff, even if only
implied. That promise must be that the defendant would keep the trade
secret information confidential, use the information only in a certain
way, or both. The plaintiff must prove, in short, that the defendant
breached a contract.
2. Or Tortious Behavior
The only other way a trade secret owner can enforce his property
right against a defendant is if the owner proves that the defendant
trespassed on his land, invaded his privacy in some commercially
immoral way, committed a strict liability tort, or breached the
defendant’s fiduciary duty. The owner must prove, in short that the
defendant committed tortious behavior.
To enforce trade secret rights, which are property rights, the owner,
as plaintiff, must prove that the defendant either breached a contract or
committed a tort, or both. Trade secrets, as property, contain within
them both the owners’ rights to enforce related agreements limiting
disclosure and use, and the owners’ rights to be free of conversions,
trespasses, fiduciary duty breaches, privacy invasions, etc. Trade secret
rights, which are property rights, are therefore a composite of contract
rights and tort rights.

230. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Carpenter, Intellectual Property: The Overlap between
Utility Patents, Plant Patents, the PVPA, and Trade Secrets and the Limitations on That
Overlap, 81 N.D. L. REV. 171, 172 (2005).
231. Uniform Trade Secrets Act §§ 2–3 (1985).
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B. Remedies
Just as trade secret rights are the sum of tort rights and property
rights, trade secret remedies are the sum of the corresponding contract
remedies and tort remedies.
1. Include Contract Remedies
Trade secret owners that are prevailing plaintiffs can receive awards
of damages representing the owners’ reasonable expectations regarding
232
the defendants’ performances. These damages include the plaintiffs’
233
The owner expected the
lost profits due to the infringement.
defendant to honor the defendant’s nondisclosure obligation; when the
defendant breaches, the plaintiff’s lost profits are the expectation
234
interest. Courts will also grant equitable relief to owners, preventing
defendants from additional breaches of related agreements regulating
235
the use and disclosure of the information.
These remedies are of course the standard breach of contract
236
remedies.
Courts grant these remedies, however, without regard to
whether any particular plaintiff proves breach of contract; i.e., courts
grant contract remedies in appropriate cases even if the plaintiffs proved
237
infringement by defendant’s tortious behavior (e.g., trespass, etc.).
2. And Tort Remedies
Trade secret owners that are prevailing plaintiffs can receive awards
of damages that make owners whole after the losses the defendants’
238
infringements caused.
These damages include the plaintiffs’ lost
profits, i.e. the amount the plaintiffs lost due to the defendants’ tortious
behavior. Plaintiff trade secret owners can recover lost profits even in
239
the absence of breached nondisclosure agreements. Owners can also
recover the defendants’ wrongful profits made from defendants’ use of

232. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Application of Patent Law Damages Analysis to
Trade Secret Misappropriation Claims: Apportionment, Alternatives, and Other Common
Limitations on Damages, 25 SEATTLE U. L. R. 821, 826 (2002).
233. Id. at 832.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., D. Kirk Jamieson, Just Deserts: A Model to Harmonize Trade Secret
Injunctions, 72 NEB. L. REV. 515, 516 (1993).
236. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 345 (1981).
237. E.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act §§ 2–3 (2011).
238. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 232, at 826–66.
239. E.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 3 (2011).
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plaintiffs’ trade secrets; these are restitutionary recoveries. Plaintiff
owners can, in addition, recover nominal damages when appropriate,
and punitive damages for defendants’ willful trade secret
242
infringement.
Trade secret owners that are prevailing plaintiffs can also, as stated
above, receive injunctions preventing further use or disclosure of the
information by the defendants. This remedy is the same as injunctions
243
preventing future or continuing torts, which courts commonly grant.
Courts therefore grant to prevailing trade secret plaintiffs all the same
remedies courts regularly grant to successful tort plaintiffs; this is
without regard to whether any particular plaintiff proved facts
244
amounting to a tort in a specific case.
C. Trade Secrets
Consider the integration of what the text above demonstrates
regarding trade secrets.
1. Are Property
Trade secrets are property; i.e., the law gives owners exclusive rights
in trade secret information, which owners can enforce in court by
receiving the corresponding property remedies.
a. Alienable
Trade secrets have all the legal characteristics of all property
interests. Trade secrets are freely alienable by the rightful possessors of
245
Owners can exploit, sell, lend, license,
qualifying information.
246
hypothecate, or keep trade secrets to themselves; these are defining
247
characteristics of property.
b. Need Not Exploit
Trade secret owners do not need to exploit the information to
240. Smith, supra note 232, at 836.
241. Id. at 841.
242. See, e.g., Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Johnson, 23 P.3d 1287, 1288–90 (Colo. App. 2001).
243. See, e.g., Baranan v. Fulton County, 209 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ga. 1974).
244. See, e.g., Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 314 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1958).
245. E.g., Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 223–25 (2d Cir. 1971).
246. E.g., ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS §
2.01 (2011).
247. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); MILGRIM, supra
note 246, at § 2.02.
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248

preserve the information’s character as property. Owners can destroy
249
or ignore the information as they choose, just as property owners may
250
in most cases. (There are of course familiar exceptions to this latter
rule for some property owners in some cases, particularly in situations in
which there are multiple possessors of, users of, or claimants to a given
251
parcel of real estate.
In those situations, courts often invoke such
252
doctrines as those regarding “owners sleeping on their rights” or
253
“highest and best use.” )
2. But Also Sum of Tort and Contract
As the discussion above at section VII(B) demonstrates, however,
trade secret rights and remedies are also the aggregation of contract and
tort rights and remedies. Infringement of trade secret requires the
defendant either to breach a legally enforceable promise or commit
254
tortious behavior such as trespass or invasion of privacy.
a. Rights and Defendants are Cumulative
A trade secret owner’s rights, as a property owner, are to exclusive
use, possession, and enjoyment of her property: the trade secret
255
information.
The owner’s rights are also to satisfaction of its
reasonable expectations when sharing the information (contract rights)
and to be free of conversion, trespass, and fiduciary duty breach
regarding the information (tort rights).
The possible defendants in a trade secret infringement case consist
of breach of contract defendants (those who received the trade secret
information pursuant to an express or implied agreement not to disclose
or misuse the information) and tort defendants (those who acquired or

248. See, e.g., MILGRIM, supra note 246, at § 2.01.
249. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 88 P.3d 71, 80 (Cal. 2004).
250. See, e.g., Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, More Is Not Always Better Than Less: An
Exploration in Property Law, 92 MINN. L. REV. 634, 641 (2008).
251. See, e.g., id. at 640–42.
252. See, e.g., Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession against the States: The Hornbooks
Have It Wrong, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 941 (1996).
253. See, e.g., id. at 956 n. 83.
254. See, e.g., Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 216 F. 401, 412 (W.D. Mich. 1908)
(defendants allegedly spied to steal trade secrets); Cemen Tech, Inc. v. Three D Indus.,
L.L.C., 753 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 2008) (defendant breached nondisclosure agreement in
disclosing secret information).
255. David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV.
543, 545 (1992).
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misused the information pursuant to conversion, trespass, fiduciary duty
breach, etc.).
b. Remedies are Cumulative
A trade secret owner’s remedies for infringement are damages
representing the plaintiff’s lost profits, the defendant’s wrongful profits,
a reasonable royalty for the infringing activity, or some combination of
these to restore the plaintiff to his pre-infringement position and give
him the benefit of any bargain he made with the defendant; and
256
These remedies consist
injunctions preventing further infringement.
of breach of contract remedies (lost profits and reasonable royalties are
expectation damages, and a combination restoring the plaintiff to his
257
pre-infringement position is reliance damages ) and tort remedies (the
injunction preventing future wrongful activity, as well as nominal and
punitive damages).
VIII. EXPLANATORY POWER
While the analysis above is interesting theoretically and from a
jurisprudential standpoint, one must consider what ramifications the
insight has for the law in general, especially property law outside of the
intellectual property field.
One of the signs of a valuable analytic method is its ability to
258
explicate existing unexplained outcomes. This is especially valuable in
law: economic analysis of law, for example, has been well received and
influential at least in part because it is able to explain many of what
observers might perceive to be inconsistencies or oddities in our legal
259
system. (E.g., economic analysis of law has successfully justified such
doctrines as the unenforceability of penalties for breaching contracts,
260
etc.)
A. Rights and Defendants
Property owners’ rights are to exclusive use, possession, and
enjoyment of their properties, and within reason, how the owners

256. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 232, at 826–66.
257. E.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 3 and accompanying official comments (1985).
258. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Path of the Law Today: Prediction and
Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773 (1998) (using existing law and case decisions to predict the
outcome of future cases).
259. E.g., Lahav, supra note 76, at 163.
260. E.g., id.
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choose to use and enjoy their properties are the owners’ choices. This is
a composite of the tort right, to be free of injuries to their properties,
and the contract right to the owner’s expectations that others will
perform as promised regarding the property. That is, if others injure the
property (or property rights) of an owner, or do not perform regarding
the property as promised (as to redeliver, repair, care for, the property,
etc.), the owner is denied exclusive use, possession, or enjoyment of the
property.
Plaintiffs choose their potential contract defendants by entering into
legally enforceable agreements with the defendants. Plaintiffs exercise
less choice, and occasionally none at all, regarding their potential tort
defendants. Potential contract defendants are therefore voluntary, and
potential tort defendants involuntary. Potential property defendants
include everyone: “all the world” in Locke’s famous phrase. The sum of
voluntary defendants and involuntary defendants is everyone.
B. Remedies
1. Assumpsit
Viewing property as the sum of tort and contract helps explain
certain oddities of property law. Some of the easiest examples come
from the field of property remedies. An obvious one is that favorite of
law school and bar examination students: the doctrine of “waiving the
tort and suing in assumpsit.” While modern practice disfavors such old
261
fashioned Latin legalese terms as “assumpsit,” the doctrine is alive and
262
well in current practice, although often called “quasi-contract,” a
name that better illustrates how property is the sum of tort and contract.
In property based causes of action such as conversion, the plaintiff
263
property owner often has a choice of remedies.
The tort remedy is
generally damages for the market value, at the time of conversion, of
264
the converted property.
If the plaintiff can show the property was
unique and hence irreplaceable (meaning that the presumption that the
plaintiff can use the damages to purchase a substitute does not apply),
the court will sometimes issue a mandatory injunction requiring the
defendant to return possession of the property to the plaintiff. These
are the common law tort remedies of replevin, for chattels, or ejectment,
261. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 88, at 384–91.
262. Id. at 384–91.
263. E.g., Vissenberg v. Bresnahen, 202 P.2d 663 (Wyo. 1949).
264. E.g., Bayer v. Airlift Int’l, Inc., 268 A.2d 548, 552 (N.J. Ch. 1970) (quoting Dimock
v. United States Nat’l Bank, 25 A. 926, 928 (N.J. 1893)).
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265

for realty. There is also the quasi-contract remedy of assumpsit.
To begin with the simplest example, consider a defendant who
266
misappropriates the plaintiff’s money. Money is of course property, so
the plaintiff’s causes of action and remedies are property based. The
267
Despite money being
plaintiff’s cause of action is for conversion.
fungible, the conversion tort cause of action requires the plaintiff, in an
action for damages, to prove specifically which identifiable money the
268
defendant wrongfully took.
If the plaintiff can satisfy that
requirement (along with, of course, all the other elements of the cause
of action), the plaintiff can receive a damages judgment for the value of
269
the misappropriated money.
Conversion being a property-based cause of action, however, the
plaintiff can choose an alternate, contract based, remedy to the tort
damages remedy already discussed. This is what the common law of
270
restitution called “waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit.” Assumpsit
means quasi-contract, that is, an implied contract between the plaintiff
271
and defendant. In this alternative, the plaintiff does not have to prove
the misappropriation of specific identifiable funds, but merely that the
272
circumstances have unjust enriched the defendant. The theory is one
of the “common counts” of debt collection: that the defendant “had and
received” the plaintiff’s money, and that receipt and possession contains
an implicit promise to repay the money to the plaintiff. By keeping the
plaintiff’s money, the defendant breaks the implicit promise (and thus
breaches an implied contract), and it would be unjust to allow the
273
defendant to keep the money.
The money conversion plaintiff, as a property owner, thus has
remedies in both tort and in contract. This doubling of remedies, one
tort based, and one contract based, in property related causes of action
is the rule, not the exception. For example, the cause of action for the
conversion of a chattel (i.e., tangible personal property that is not

265. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 88, at 384–91.
266. See In re Estate of Miller, 48 Cal. 165, 169 (1874) (using an interesting historical
treatment of the definition of “money”).
267. E.g., In re Thebus, 483 N.E.2d 1258, 1261 (Ill. 1985).
268. Id. at 1260.
269. Id. at 1261.
270. E.g., Bd. of Hwy. Commrs. v. Bloomington, 97 N.E. 280, 284–85 (Ill. 1911).
271. Id.
272. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 88, at 384–87.
273. Id. at 210.
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274

money ) provides the same choice of tort damages or quasi-contract
275
restitution as does the cause of action for money misappropriation.
2. Bailments
Bailments are another example of this accumulation of remedies. A
bailor gives temporary possession of the subject property to the bailee,
such as when one leaves one’s car with a mechanic for repairs or leaves
276
one’s clothes with a cleaner. If the bailor wrongfully refuses to return
the bailed property, the owner has, again, a choice of a contract based
remedy and a tort based remedy. The property owner can sue the
bailee for damages resulting from the breach of contract, such as the
money the bailor paid the bailee for work not done or improperly done
277
on the bailed goods.
The owner can also recover tort damages for
278
destruction, conversion, or damage to the goods bailed.
Both the conversion and bailment examples demonstrate that
property based causes of action have two sets of remedies: a basic
contract like remedy, which essentially effects the sale of the subject
property, and also an additional, often restitutionary, tort remedy that is
frequently more generous to the property owning plaintiff than the
contract remedy. This article’s thesis, that property is the sum of
contract and tort, helps explain this apparent oddity in property law.
IX. CONCLUSION
In summary, Hegel argued that tort and crime law are together the
sum of contract and property law. A better, more current, explanation
in American law property is the sum of contract and tort. Trade secret
law illustrates this proposal well, because trade secret rights, defendants,
and remedies are the total of respective contract and tort rights,
defendants, and remedies. Trade secret law thus illustrates how
contract and tort come together to create property rights. This theory
helps understand why, e.g., property based causes of action, even those
outside the intellectual property field, have both a tort based and a
contract based remedy.

274. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 98 (definition of “chattels
personal”)(citing 42 AM. JUR. 2D Property § 24).
275. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 88, at 388–90.
276. E.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 162 (9th ed. 2009) (definition of “bailment”).
277. E.g., AM. JUR. BAILMENTS § 130 (2d ed. 2011).
278. E.g., id.

